JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Information about the prehistoric past is available only in the material remains. To be meaningful, these remains must be interpreted under the influence of a theory of some general or specific aspect of the past. For this reason, prehistoric archaeology clearly shows the reciprocity between theory and evidence and the tension between having to impose information on the evidence in order to discover information in the evidence. We use a specific case in the archaeology of Minoan Crete, a case that uses Central Place Theory as a guide to understanding the evidence, to demonstrate a coherence model of scientific knowledge. 
Introduction. Much of what has been written under the heading of the philosophy of archaeology has been in the spirit of applying some aspect of philosophy to illuminate and perhaps influence archaeological methods.
The so-called New Archaeology of the 1960's and 70's sought to fit the study of the material past into a mold taken without changes from empiricist philosophy of science. Subsequent contextualist archaeology adopted a philosophical hermeneutics as the model for reading the past. In contrast, the spirit of this paper is exactly the opposite. Our project is to use a methodological study of archaeology to illuminate and influence the philosophy of science.
We are, of course, not alone in working on a reciprocity between philosophy and archaeology. R. G Collingwood made it clear in his autobiography (1939, 30) that his own participation in archaeology influenced what he believed about general issues of epistemology and metaphysics. More recently, A. Wylie's work is the best example of using each discipline to inform the other. She both explicitly describes the value of cooperation between philosophy and archaeology (Wylie 1985 ) and effectively uses a 2. The Coherence Model of Justification. The general point that the material record of the past does not speak for itself has been made often (Binford 1977 , Schiffer 1988 , Shanks and Tilley 1987 , Wylie 1993 ). Training and expertise are required to realize what the data, whether from individual artifacts, sites or regional surveys, indicate about the past. This requirement is enough to show that the data in the present cannot be useful as evidence of the past without the influence of some background knowledge, the currency of expertise. And since archaeological evidence is useful only if it is relevant to some objects or events in the past, the influential background knowledge must itself be, at least in part, of things in the past. Thus, there is an essential tension in archaeological evidence, a tension between having to impose information on the evidence, on the one hand, and using the evidence to provide information, on the other.
It is important to get beyond this general claim about the evidence to both broaden and deepen our understanding of the structure of the justification of archaeological knowledge. We need to ask about the kinds of claims that function as the background knowledge, whether they are dis-
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CENTRAL PLACE THEORY tinguished in terms of their content or their own epistemic status from other constituents of archaeological knowledge. In what follows, we will identify the background knowledge with middle-range theorizing, and argue that the middle-range theories are of no special content but can be any sort of claim that is used in the special role of giving meaning and credibility to the evidence. Furthermore, middle-range theories are themselves tested and justified like any other archaeological claims, since they are just any other archaeological claim.
The distinction between data and evidence is very much like the distinction made by Bogen and Woodward (1988) between data and phenomena. The data, what archaeologists refer to as the stuff "on the ground," are the particular bits and assemblages of artifacts. But the conclusions that are the products of archaeology are claims about what happened in the past. Thus, the data in the present must be made informative of events and situations in the past. Unlike Bogen and Woodward, we see this link as being secured only with the help of background theoretical influence, with the middle-range theories.
By looking beyond the relation between evidence and its middle-range support, to the relation between the middle-range theory and its evidential support, we hope to show the larger picture of archaeological knowledge. The reciprocity of support between theory and evidence will demonstrate a network of claims without epistemic hierarchy or foundations of justification. The analysis of middle-range theories will be evidence that justification must be found in coherence among claims rather than in relying on any, or any type, as foundation.
Internal coherence as the criterion of credibility runs the risk of circularity. The relation between archaeological theory and evidence is a kind of hermeneutic circle in that specific, particular reports of observation are given meaning under the influence of more general understanding supplied by theories, while the theoretical claims are themselves influenced and given credibility by the specifics of evidence. The reciprocity, and the tension it creates between the need to impose information and the ambition to discover information, do not necessarily degrade the epistemic value of archaeological evidence or preclude the possibility of objectivity in archaeology. The circle is broken and the tension is eased as long as the theories used in support of some particular evidence are not tested and justified by that same evidence. A middle-range theory requires some evidential support, but not necessarily from the very evidence to which it gives meaning. Insisting on an independence between the theory used to support evidence and the theory that benefits from the evidence amounts to a kind of objectivity in the process of justifying archaeological knowledge.
Hodder ( There is also precedent for applying a hermeneutic structure to the natural sciences, as in Reading the Book of Nature (Kosso 1992) . In both of these contexts, a Duhem-Quine type network of knowledge is extended to show some details of the dynamics in the relation between theory and observation. Claims about the nature of middle-range theories, their fit into a coherent network of knowledge, and the escape from circularity, all depend on the details of the relation between data, evidence, and background knowledge. We will present the details through a consideration of prehistoric, Middle Minoan, Crete. In particular we will consider the old palace, or proto-palace period (roughly 1900-1650 BC). One of the vexatious problems in the study of old palace period Crete is, and has been, how the population centers interacted and influenced one another.
Real cases of archaeological knowledge, in their presentation of evidence and conclusions, do not usually show, at least not on the surface, the coherent structure that we claim is essential in the nature of justification. This is because the middle-range theories are not always, and indeed are not usually, explicit in the presentation of evidence. Nonetheless, they must always be available and amenable to articulation if the evidence and, hence, the conclusions it supports are to have any credibility. This is to say that while it may be too strict to insist that one must in fact give justification for all knowledge claims, it is a basic responsibility that the community must at least have justification available, even for evidential claims.
This conclusion is based on principles of what theories do and what is required to make observations relevant to theory. We need to see now that in fact, not only in principle, this is the case and that middle-range theories can be seen in action and can be articulated. We will do this for the case of Middle Minoan Crete. Middle-range theories, the case will show, are not special kinds of theories with a special kind of content. They are not necessarily of middle-generality or of middling confirmation (nor particularly solid confirmation). They are just regular theories that are, in the particular circumstances that we find them here, used in a particular way.
3. Minoan Settlement and Geography: the Hypothesis and Evidence. To highlight our philosophical points about the structure of justification it will be crucial to be clear about which claims are being tested in any particular case, and which claims are being used in support of the testing. In the case presented here, it is a model of peer polity interaction that is the hypothesis being tested. The Central Place Theory we then focus on is being used as a middle-range theory in the context of Middle Minoan Crete.
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We will first articulate the hypothesis and the evidence for its testing. In this case, the hypothesis has both a general and a specific presentation. In general it deals with the formation of centers of political and economic authority, that is, the early stages of states, regions of domination and control. The proposed model of this process to be studied here claims that the formation of a centralized state does not generally begin with a single center of authority or a single unit of association. A large, centralized state is usually preceded by a mosaic of several small independent states. This model of peer polity is summarized by J. Cherry (1986, 19) , "In many instances of state formation . . . the initial stages in the process do not involve the rise of a single, monolithic, socio-political unit in splendid isolation; on the contrary, the normal pattern suggested by the archaeological record is one that implies a group of relatively small-scale entities in synchronic and interdependent evolution." Often these "early state modules" (Renfrew 1984, 95) are discussed even in cases with no textual or monumental evidence to show the boundaries which distinguish the modules.
The specific hypothesis to be studied here is an application of this general peer polity model to a study of proto-palatial Crete. Though there is evidence of writing in this culture, the Linear A inscriptions are for us almost entirely indecipherable and the Linear B inscriptions are not useful since they are from the later, Mycenaean, period. This constrains the method of study in the sense that, "The Aegean civilizations, before the fourteenth century BC, are thus effectively fully prehistoric" (Cherry 1986, 24) . At least by the Mycenaean period, and possibly earlier, the island of Crete was united under the authority of the palace of Knossos, but before that Crete may have been a patchwork of independent but interacting polities which, through their interactions, experienced parallels in development. This is the hypothesis, that interactions among the Minoan polities caused a common cultural development. Cherry's particular focus is in using the material evidence to demonstrate the interaction and parallel development of the Cretan peer polities.
The evidence in this case is not in new things discovered after the proposal of the hypothesis, but in attention to newly relevant information in old evidence. Similarities, beyond what are to be expected from chance, at coincident times at different polities, are taken to be evidence of communication and influence between peer polities. Six independent polities are identified with the six major palace sites. These sites all have some evidence of early palace remains. Three of these (Knossos, Mallia and Phaistos) are fairly non-controversial palace sites . The remaining three (Khania, Zakros and Monastiraki) should be considered "possible" palace sites of the old palace period. These are the six largest island sites with at least some traditional palace features (see below) based on present ar- There are some things that need to be clarified about this evidence, and some of the evidential claims need to be made explicit to reveal the structure of the testing. The nature of the similarities (what is similar and in what way) is important, as is the dating of the artifacts to establish coincident rather than sequential similarity. But most important for our analysis is the prerequisite demonstration of the identity of the polities as well as their independence. The archaeologist's project is to show interaction among states, and this requires as preliminary information a picture of where the states are and that they are distinct. By analogy to chemistry, a microscopic image of interaction between molecules requires identifying individual molecules before we can see them interacting. It is the analogous process of imaging and identifying the individual states which will involve middle-range theories in a way that is informative about the nature of evidence in archeology.
First a note on the evidence of similarities among the artifacts: Claims of similarity in the artifacts are largely data claims in the sense of being about the immediately accessible information in the present material remains. The palaces themselves are part of this aspect of the evidence. Though they differ in their grand structural design, they share details of style to a degree that is greater than would be expected of chance coincidence or environmental influence. For example, the overall conceptions of the palaces, technical innovations and designs, as well as the functional arrangements of the palace including the directional orientation of the 
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Renfrew both tests and fine-tunes his XTENT model by comparing its results to modern maps of places and boundaries. The function f and constant k must be set, and this is done on a trial-and-refine basis until the process generates maps that simply look right, that is, that include numbers and sizes of independent states that resemble historically and currently known maps. Actual data of settlement sizes and locations are put into the equation to generate predictions of boundaries. This hypothetical map is compared to the actual map and, for modern Europe, the match is quite impressive. The model differs significantly from the actual 1984 map by predicting autonomy for the regions of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Renfrew 1984, 70) .
The basics of Central Place Theory are tested by G. Johnson, who uses them to generate hypotheses about the spatial distributions of artifacts and settlements in the Uruk Valley of Mesopotamia (Johnson 1972; 1975) . In one case, trade interaction patterns are predicted using Central Place Theory together with the data of settlement sizes and locations. These predictions about Uruk trade patterns are compared against evidence of trade interaction as determined through analysis of pottery-style distributions (Johnson 1975) , that is, evidence generated independently of the Central Place Theory it is testing. Again, the Central Place Theory predictions compare favorably.
A test of Central Place Theory that is closer to the case of Minoan Crete is that produced by the Cambridge/Bradford Boiotia survey (Bintliff 1984, Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985) . Thiessen polygons were drawn around major settlements of Archaic-Classical Boiotia and these theory-generated boundaries were compared to "actual state boundaries derived from written sources" (Bintliff 1984, 219) . The two maps, theoretical and historical were shown in superposition and the match is impressive (ibid.). Two places, Thebes and Orchomenos, showed significantly larger historical extent than theoretically predicted, but their size matches the textual account of expansion of these two polities. Thus the Central Place Theory worked to image the pre-Classical early state modules, and the image was used with the Classical textual evidence to produce the first frame in a diachronic view of the changing state boundaries. We see the early stages of unification of Boiotia as "this early state mosaic is moving towards a much larger ethnic polity" (ibid.). In this case, Central Place Theory and the data of settlement remains are used to produce an image of the outlines of the polities. The theory and the settlement data support the basic existence claims about Minoan polities from which the analysis of interaction begins. The fine-structure of the specimen, details about interaction and cultural development, is evidenced in the styles and timing of particular artifacts such as pottery and palace architecture. Central Place Theory, the middle-range theory which accounts for the evidence of the extent of the polities, is independent of the hypothesis about cultural interactions. The credibility of the theoretical account of the location of borders and autonomy of states is not based on the hypothetical claim of interaction. The use of the middlerange theory is not self-serving in the sense of sponsoring evidence in its own behalf.
Using Central Place Theory as
Again the analogy to microbiology is helpful. Imaging the molecules to study may require a process of dyeing, that is, fixing heavy atoms of a dye to some of the atoms of the specimen molecule. Seeing the microscopeproduced image as the boundaries of a molecule requires a theoretical account of the composition of the molecule to associate the parts which
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PETER KOSSO AND CYNTHIA KOSSO appear (the heavy atoms) with the entire object. Thus claims about the basic composition of the molecule enter the evidential picture as middlerange theories, but they retain a degree of independence from a hypothesis about molecule-to-molecule interactions. The point is that theoretical claims about the basic composition or extent of an object such as a molecule or a polity can be used in accounting for evidence used to test a hypothesis about the details of interactions of the object, and the evidence can still be independent of the hypothesis in a way that makes the test objective and meaningful.
Talking about observing through a microscope is reminiscent of Hacking's (1983) account of observation and intervention. Our description of evidence in archaeology is like Hacking's view of observation in general in its appeal to independence to break problematic circularities in the reciprocity between theory and evidence. But the account of evidence we are presenting, under the influence of the prehistoric archaeological case, has a significant difference from Hacking's. Hacking cites cases in which no theory plays an explicit role in noticing relevant features of evidence (for example, untrained technicians picking out specific events in particle detectors), and treats them as cases of observation that are not theory-laden in an important way. Our contention is that in the archaeological cases, even when no middle-range theories are apparent, they are always necessary for the epistemic enhancement from data to useful evidence.
The independence between the middle-range theory and the hypothesis is an indication of an objective test of the hypothesis, or better, of an objective use of evidence to support a theory. This is not to say that the evidence is objective because the middle-range theory is antecedently wellproven and secure in its link between data in the present and situations in the past. The prior testing of Central Place Theory is only part of the epistemic contribution of the middle-range theory. The claim of objectivity is not, in other words, that Central Place Theory brings its own epistemic security into the process to share with the evidential claims and, derivatively, with the hypothesis. Central Place Theory is not all that secure. The imprecision in the flexibility of parameters and the relatively low number of tests leave Central Place Theory far from being a certain generalization about social authority and space. The epistemic benefit from using Central Place Theory in this case is not so much its own status of confirmation but its independence. In this sense, epistemic justification is not a property of individual claims or theories; it is a relational property among claims.
Again it will be useful to locate this account of observation and evidence with respect to another general description of observation in science, this time Shapere's (1982) . And again, there are similarities and differences. Shapere's articulation of the theories required to make meaningful observations of the interior of the sun is essentially a list of the middle-range
